Topological Social Choice
Existence and uniqueness of topological social choice is a class of problems which consider preference aggregates and generalize Arrow's impossibility theorem.
We consider:
- Set of preferences that is a topologized as a space $X$, (such as preferred prices, budget allocation ratios, or relative rankings of candidates).
- Population of $n$ agents, each with a fixed preference.
- The state of that population's preferences is an $n$-tuple of points $\xi \in X^n$.
The conversion of individual (local) choice into a single global choice is via social choice map $\Xi : X^n \to X$ with constraints:
- Continuity: small shifts in local preferences have small impact on the aggregate global preference.
- Unanimity: identity on the grand diagonal in $X^n$, so that a unanimous preference is accepted.
- Anonymity: $\Xi$ is invariant under the permutation on the factors of $X^n$
The question of existence of a choice map parallels existence of a Nash equilibrium in game theory. Here, instead of universal existence, there is a near-universal non-existence.
[incomplete]
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page revision: 3, last edited: 17 Aug 2023 03:41